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2013 : le temps des architectes 
Depuis le déclenchement de la crise 
économique et financière de 2008, 
les  autor ités  européennes – 
nationales et communautaires – ont 
dû donner la priorité à leur rôle de 
pompier, en vue de combattre les 
ravages  occas ionnés  par  le 
déclenchement puis la propagation 
de cette crise. Parce que tous les 
moyens y ont été consacrés, l’objectif 
d’éteindre l’incendie est aujourd’hui 
atteint, ou peu s’en faut, et tant l’euro 
que l’Europe sortent renforcés de 
cette épreuve.  
Surtout, les leçons de l’Histoire ont été 
tirées, ainsi qu’en attestent pour 
l’immédiat l’entrée en vigueur du 
pacte budgétaire européen et du 
mécanisme européen de stabilité, et 
pour le moyen terme le rapport 
« a Pour  une vér i t ab le  un ion 
économique et monétaire », présenté 
en juin 2012 par les présidents du 
Conseil, de la Commission, de 
l’Eurogroupe et de la Banque 
centrale européenne. 
En ce début d’année 2013, les 
conditions semblent réunies pour que le 
temps des pompiers étant presque 
achevé, s’ouvre maintenant le temps 
des architectes et que la priorité des 
dirigeants européens soit désormais de 
concevoir – puis de bâtir – une 
véritable union économique et 
monétaire, qui aille encore au-delà de ce 
qui a déjà été obtenu et mis en œuvre 
au cours des quatre dernières années. 
C’est à cet objectif que répond le 
Blueprint élaboré par la Commission, 
première contribution écrite à proposer 
une approche intégrée et exhaustive de 
ce que pourrait – et devrait – être une 
véritable union économique et 
monétaire, dans toutes ses composantes 
– économique, législative et politique.  
C’est à ce sujet, majeur pour l’avenir de 
l’Union européenne, qu’est consacré le 
premier numéro de l’année du BEPA 
Monthly.  
L’avenir de l’Europe n’est pas pour 
autant dans la seule préoccupation de 
soi. Du fait de son histoire et du rôle 
spécifique qu’elle entend jouer dans le 
concert des nations, l’UE continuera à 
s’impliquer dans les affaires du 
monde; 2013 lui donnera de 
nombreuses occasions de se rappeler 
cette nécessité, qu’il s’agisse des 
questions de sécurité sur le continent 
africain ou des perspectives d’un 
accord transatlantique de commerce. 
L’année 2013 se promet pleine 
d’opportunités et de défis européens à 
relever. La Commission sera au rendez-
vous.  
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The Commission’s Blueprint presents a 
comprehensive vision for a deep and 
genuine EMU conducive to a strong and 
stable architecture in the financial, fiscal, 
economic, and political domains. It recalls 
the raison d’être and aspirations of the EMU, 
presents a diagnostic of the crisis of 
confidence in the euro area (EA), and 
identifies the rationale and objectives of a 
genuine EMU. It aims to rectify the 
shortcomings of EMU’s original set up by 
proposing necessary short-, medium- and 
long-term actions for lasting stability and 
prosperity of EMU.  
The Blueprint is the first document to 
provide a comprehensive, coherent, and 
concrete design for how EMU should 
develop. While focusing on economic 
necessities, it is fully aligned to the legal 
requirements and political context. Thus, it 
offers an ambitious, realistic and pragmatic 
basis for a serious debate and for tackling 
the crisis of confidence in the EA. 
Why a Blueprint 
The EU responded to the sovereign debt 
crisis with the five-point roadmap in autumn 
2011. In parallel it tackled the challenges of 
vulnerable countries; strengthened the 
banking system; aimed to enhance the 
growth outlook through structural reforms; 
put financial firewalls on a permanent and 
more flexible footing; and set down a robust 
and integrated economic governance 
framework. Actions taken since the 2008 
financial crisis amount to a significant EMU 
overhaul, including strengthening economic 
governance through the European Semester 
and six-pack legislation, and creating a 
flexible and permanent financial firewall.  
For measures to have a positive impact on 
confidence, they will need to be seen 
working well for some time. That is why it 
has not been possible to prevent the 
sovereign debt crises from turning into a 
crisis of confidence that threatens the 
integrity of the euro area itself. A more 
important factor is the gap between the 
sharp acceleration of financial integration 
under EMU and the comparatively slow 
progress in the integration of EU-level 
financial regulation and supervision. The 
emergence of negative feedback loops 
between weaknesses in the financial sector, 
sovereign debt sustainability, and the growth 
outlook aggravated the sovereign debt crisis 
and led to a full-blown crisis of confidence, 
challenging the cohesion and very existence 
of the EA. 
The June 2012 European Council decision 
to envisage directly recapitalising troubled 
banks through the ESM on condition that an 
effective single supervisory mechanism 
(SSM) is in place, and EU finance ministers’ 
agreement on the SSM in December, were 
major steps towards breaking the negative 
feedback loop between banks and 
sovereigns. The ECB announcement to 
introduce Open Market Transactions to 
counter market speculation on re -
denomination risk and to intervene in 
secondary sovereign bond markets of member 
states complying with ESM conditionality also 
contributed to stabilising the situation since 
the autumn. Yield spread developments 
clearly indicate that the strategy has started to 
work in terms of increased financial market 
stability.  
A consensus existed already in June that the 
EU needed to move from temporary 
solutions to a stable overall architecture of 
integrated financial, budgetary, and economic 
frameworks and a commensurate evolution in 
democratic accountability and legitimacy. 
Blueprint proposals 
The crisis has clearly demonstrated the 
increased interdependence of our economies 
since the foundation of EMU and has shown 
1 Moving forward on a deep and genuine EMU 
By Marco Buti*  
* Marco Buti is the Director-General of the DG for Economic and Financial Affairs. 
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that success or failure of EMU will impact 
on all. The threat of the crisis of confidence 
is however more fundamental and requires a 
more fundamental response to convince that 
achievements in the Single Market and 
currency will not be undone, and that 
unfulfilled achievements of citizens and 
business will be realised and be maintained. 
We also need to be better equipped for the 
future to avoid the mistakes of the past. 
To be effective and credible, the response 
must chart a clear and realistic path towards 
that ultimate ambition based on the firm 
commitment of the EU institutions and its 
member states. The resulting vision must 
encompass a banking union that can end the 
disintegration of the EU’s financial market 
and ensure reasonably equal financing 
conditions for households and business 
across the EU; sever the negative feedback 
loops between member states and banks; 
and ensure that divergences between the 
business cycles across the euro area are not 
artificially amplified. The economic and 
fiscal union will deal with macroeconomic 
imbalances in the EA and provide the 
cushion for future shocks. Due to the 
inevitable transfers of sovereignty, such 
measures would require underpinning 
sufficient democratic accountability.  
The transformation of EMU cannot be 
c o m p l e t e d  o v e r n i g h t ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y 
considering the significant additional 
transfer of political powers from national to 
European level. To arrive at an EMU that 
ensures its citizens’ welfare, decisive steps 
must be launched in the short-term (in the 
next 6-18 months) that will be built on and 
followed up with steps in the medium- and 
long-term.  
The way forward needs to be carefully 
balanced. Steps towards more responsibility 
and economic discipline should be 
combined with more solidarity and financial 
support. This balance must be struck in 
parallel and in each phase of EMU 
development. Commensurate political 
integration, ensuring democratic legitimacy 
and accountability must accompany deeper 
integration of financial regulation, fiscal and 
economic policy and corresponding 
instruments. The Blueprint’s chosen gradual 
approach reflects the fact that actions 
requiring Treaty change will not be possible 
in the short term and that more ambitious 
objectives can only be reached once the 
foundations are laid down and tested. The 
Blueprint envisages Treaty change only 
where absolutely necessary but favours 
action that can be implemented à traité 
constant. 
In the short-term (in the next 6-18 months), 
the Blueprint suggests prioritising the full 
deployment of the new economic 
governance tools under the six-pack and two
-pack regulations and the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism in the banking field. Proposals 
will also be made for a Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM) which will be in charge of 
the restructuring and resolution of banks of 
the member states participating in the 
Banking Union. The Blueprint also proposes 
the creation of a common financial 
instrument through which economic reform 
plans agreed in advance between member 
states and the Commission can be 
suppor t ed .  Un i f y ing  the  ex t e rna l 
representation of the euro area is also 
envisaged as part of the short-term 
dimension.  
In the medium-term (18 months to five 
years), the Blueprint suggests closer 
economic and budgetary policy integration, 
including greater control over national 
budgetary policies – notably developing a 
dedicated fiscal capacity for the euro area, 
establishing a debt redemption fund, and 
commonly issuing eurobills.  
In the longer term (beyond five years), a full 
Banking Union comprising supervision, 
resolution, and deposit guarantee insurance 
should be completed, and a common fiscal 
capacity could develop to help stabilise and 
smooth the adverse impact of asymmetric 
shocks in the EA. A deeply integrated 
economic and fiscal governance framework 
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could ultimately allow the common issuance 
of public debt, which would enhance the 
functioning of debt markets and facilitate the 
conduct of monetary policy. 
Looking ahead 
With its Blueprint, the Commission sought 
to spark a European debate on a 
comprehensive, coherent, and concrete 
design for a deep and genuine EMU. This 
document is also a blueprint for concrete 
short-term action and should facilitate the 
adoption of the two-pack legislation. The 
Commission announced legislative proposals 
for 2013 on the creation of a Single 
Resolution Mechanism, a ‘competitiveness 
and convergence instrument’, and ex-ante 
coordination of major reforms. The 
European Commission will also work 
towards a single seat for the euro area on 
the IMF executive board. 
The December 2012 European Council was 
not the occasion for agreement on specific 
proposals but provided a valuable 
opportunity to develop a common political 
vision and plan for short-, medium- and 
longer-term steps. The Conclusions refer to 
numerous Blueprint proposals for the 
immediate term, such as ex ante coordination 
of major national reforms; contractual 
arrangements between the member states 
and the EU institutions; and –  linked to this 
–  solidarity mechanisms at EU level to 
support the implementation of reforms.  
The Blueprint’s medium- and longer-term 
ideas remain on the table for the debate that 
will have to take place before significant 
changes to the Treaties can be envisaged. 
The Commission will identify –  ahead of the 
next European Parliament electoral 
campaign –  areas of possible Treaty change.   
A blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU
Launching a European debate
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and implementation of two-pack 
2. Banking Union: Financial regulation and supervision: quick agreement on proposals 
for a Single Rulebook and Single Supervisory Mechanism 
3. Banking Union: Single Resolution Mechanism 
4. Quick decision on the next Multi-annual Financial Framework 
5. Ex-ante coordination of major reforms and the creation of a Convergence and 
Competitiveness Instrument (CCI) 
6. Promoting investment in the Euro Area in line with the Stability and Growth Pact 
7. External representation of the Euro Area 
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2. Proper fiscal capacity for the Euro Area building on the CCI  
3. Redemption fund 
4. Eurobills 
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1. Full Banking Union 
2. Full fiscal and economic union 
Political union: Commensurate progress on democratic legitimacy and 
accountability  
Blueprint proposals for short-, medium-, and long-term actions for lasting stability and prosperity of EMU. 
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At the December Summit, significant 
progress was made on completing the 
European architecture. But many urgent 
issues remain on the table.   
First, on the positive side, the finance 
ministers agreed on the first important step 
towards a banking union: the establishment 
of a single supervisory mechanism (SSM). 
The compromise they have reached seems 
to be a good one.  
The European Central Bank will be in a 
strong position and responsible for the 
overall functioning of the single 
supervisory mechanism. It will have direct 
oversight of euro area banks in a 
differentiated way, depending on the size of 
banks. But ultimately, all critical cases will 
be under the direct oversight of the 
European Central Bank which will also 
have the right to scrutinise banks below the 
size threshold. This is important to avoid 
competitive distortions but also to prevent 
major problems arising from small banks, 
which taken together still represent a large 
share of the EU banking sector.  
Also, when financial assistance is given, the 
European Central Bank will become the 
supervisor of the banks concerned, 
meaning coverage can be extended to a 
number of Spanish Cajas with balance 
sheets of less than 30 billion euros. The 
compromise also appropriately allows non-
euro area countries to participate in the 
single supervisory mechanism. 
The common supervisor will play an 
important role in overcoming the financial 
market segmentation that is currently 
observed in the euro area. Part of the 
segmentation is a direct result of the 
actions of national supervisors, which limit 
the liquidity operations within banking 
groups located in different countries. 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that this 
situation has been a constraint for a 
number of large banking groups in Europe. 
This constraint has de facto aggravated the 
segmentation of the interbank market, 
which the European Central Bank via its 
liquidity operations had to compensate for. 
The first task of the new European Central 
Bank supervisor will therefore be to end 
current supervisory practices that lead to a 
segmentation along national borders.  
Second, the Council Conclusions stress the 
need to move ahead with a common bank 
resolution authority and acknowledge that a 
purely national system of resolution would 
not be effective. This is a major and very 
important change in the European policy 
position: until very recently, many member 
states, and the European Commission, 
argued that national resolution would 
suffice. However, a banking union without 
a common resolution authority would not 
be a genuine banking union. Without a 
common form of resolution, there can be 
no form of risk-sharing because the moral 
hazard issues could not be contained 
otherwise. Also, without risk-sharing, one 
of the main aims of the banking union – to 
break out of the vicious circle linking bank 
debt and sovereign debt – cannot be fully 
achieved. The single financial market would 
remain fragmented.  
Centralising resolution powers entails a 
major transfer of sovereignty, which in turn 
requires very deep reforms and clear 
thinking about democratic accountability. 
The European Commission’s Blueprint for a 
deep and genuine economic and monetary union  
claims that such a resolution mechanism 
can be created without changes to the 
2 A genuine monetary union? 
By Guntram Wolff  *  
* Guntram Wolff is the Deputy Director of the economic think tank Bruegel. 
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European Union Treaty. At first sight, it is 
difficult to see how this could be possible. 
It is certainly of major importance to 
explore in the coming weeks what would be 
feasible in the current framework and what 
other options exist besides Treaty change. 
One option may be to agree on a new 
intergovernmental Treaty.  
So on the banking front, the December 
European Council made quite a bit of 
progress even though much remains still 
to be settled. Regarding fiscal union, the 
summit was a disappointment. The 
founding fathers of the euro were aware 
of the need to complement monetary 
with fiscal union, but left difficult 
choices for future decision-makers.  
The time has come to address a series 
of unanswered questions. Should there be 
a proper euro area budget? Should a new 
system be conceived as an intergovernmental 
transfer scheme? Or should the ability of 
sovereigns to borrow be restored through 
some form of mutual guarantee? What 
should be the degree and type of 
conditionality? What kind of sharing of 
sovereignty is needed? What institutional 
changes need to be put in place before 
more fiscal integration can be achieved? 
What does a euro area fiscal union mean 
for the European Union as a whole?  
Europe needs to think more deeply about 
how to organise the deleveraging of its 
debt. It is unlikely that prolonged high 
levels of savings would alone be enough to 
do the trick. However, the proposals that 
have been floated, such as for eurobills and 
the redemption fund, all insufficiently 
reflect on the institutional foundations that 
such solutions require. The European 
Commission could make a greater effort to 
consider on the institutional basis that 
more risk-sharing would involve.  
It was evidently too early to take any 
decision at the summit given the limited 
technical and political consensus on the 
issues. However, a reflection process 
should have been initiated. European 
Council President Herman Van Rompuy 
was willing to oversee it. The European 
Commission was right in its pre-summit 
Communication on the Blueprint to 
highlight the important issue of how to deal 
with the debt overhang in the euro area. 
Had Europe’s leaders agreed to work 
further on these issues, they would have 
demonstrated that they are able to think 
strategically.  
A further criticism can be made about the 
Council’s and Commission’s analysis of the 
macroeconomic situation. While a relatively 
detailed timetable for a banking union 
exists, no specific steps to restore growth 
in Europe quickly are currently on the 
table.  
There is obviously a major structural 
component to Europe’s weak growth that 
needs to be addressed urgently. Structural 
action however, would produce growth in 
perhaps three years’ time; so the outlook 
for the next two years would remain bleak. 
This holds true particularly for the countries 
of southern Europe.  
The European Commission and the Council 
need to use the European Semester 
procedure more sincerely to agree on the 
truly important macroeconomic policies 
that Europe should enact now to overcome 
its dramatic decline in growth. The 
European Commission as the initiator of 
the European Semester will have to take the 
lead and argue for a comprehensive position 
on how Europe’s macroeconomic policy 
should be shaped in the next few years. 
Long-term reforms are no substitute for 
this need, because anaemic growth in 
Europe will undermine them. Pro-forma, 
across-the-board policy recommendations 
as currently set out in the European 
Semester do not constitute a strategy.  
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The severity of the crisis and its progression 
from the banking sector to sovereign debt 
exposed numerous shortcomings in the design 
of EMU, so that a comprehensive recasting to 
achieve a ‘deep and genuine economic and 
monetary union’ was, arguably, unavoidable. 
The question now is whether the range of 
measures taken and the proposals for further 
reform summarised in the Commission’s 
Blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and 
monetary union will suffice to put economic and 
monetary union back on track.  
Blueprint steps for actions 
As explained in section 2 of the Blueprint, the 
reforms enacted are far-reaching, encompassing 
various measures aimed at assuring fiscal 
discipline, better policy coordination and more 
effective crisis resolution, alongside a 
strengthening of financial regulation and 
supervision. The Blueprint is correct to 
emphasise the progress that has been achieved 
and the coherence of the further measures in 
the pipeline, but it is regrettable that financial 
markets and many commentators have been 
slow to appreciate their scope. A possible 
metaphor is a jigsaw puzzle in which all the 
pieces were scattered over the table early in 
2010. These pieces have progressively been 
assembled into a picture which, while still 
having some gaps, looks coherent. 
The Blueprint contains a number of more 
contentious elements, such as macroeconomic 
conditionality and the notion of a ‘contract’ 
between the member states and Commission, 
both of which reinforce the controlling role of 
EU governance. While the rationale for such 
measures is well explained, it is acknowledged 
that the corollary must be strengthened 
accountability. The Commission, in particular, 
will have to be very sensitive in how it 
approaches the use of sticks and carrots in 
performing this role. To take one example, the 
suggestion (page 23) that ‘under certain 
conditions, consideration of relevant factors 
may lead to not placing a member state in 
EDP’, could be provocative where a member 
state simply reaches a different conclusion 
based on credible alternative analysis. So far so 
good, but will it be enough? There are three 
areas in which what is proposed risks falling 
short, all of which exemplify the messy political 
economy of transforming EMU. 
Gaps and challenges 
The first is that the proposals in the Blueprint 
for an EU level stabilisation capacity seem 
rather too tentative. The discussion of fiscal 
capacity is couched in terms of supporting 
economic coordination in the short- and 
medium-term, and refers for the long-term, to 
supporting ‘member states in the absorption of 
shocks’. The focus on asymmetric shocks 
suggests that the trickier question of EU level 
stabilisation policy is not being countenanced 
and that monetary policy will remain the 
primary instrument to deal with a future 
symmetric shock. Will this be enough? While 
the collective fiscal stimulus agreed in 2009 in 
the wake of the steep recession was a timely – 
and necessary – response, it was ad hoc and the 
absence of a genuine EU level stabilisation 
capability could be construed a gap in a genuine 
EMU.  
Although even a limited instrument to support 
member states in difficulty would, nevertheless, 
be valuable and revives a debate held in the 
early 1990s about buffer funds or similar 
approaches, how it is constructed will matter. 
The Blueprint explicitly distinguishes such a 
capacity from the existing EU budget, but in 
the public mind, the distinction is likely to be 
problematic. Consequently, efforts will be 
needed to explain and justify an increased call 
on taxpayers. Equally, this could be an 
opportunity to rethink what might – somewhat 
pompously – be called the fiscal constitution of 
the EU, revisiting the power to tax in the 
3 Completing the EMU governance jigsaw puzzle 
By Iain Begg *  
* Professor Iain Begg is Professorial Research Fellow in the European Institute at the London School of Economics (LSE).  
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multilevel governance system as well as the 
scale of EU budgetary policy.  
The Blueprint argues that a new fiscal 
mechanism should be funded by ‘own 
resources’ and should eventually have the right 
to borrow, but suggests that its size should be 
determined by being able to ‘provide sufficient 
resources to support important structural 
reforms in a large economy under distress’. 
This line leaves it unclear whether the 
motivation would be about stabilisation or 
purely allocative, and therefore risks being a 
source of confusion. Compounding the 
problem is the continuing reluctance by 
member states to accept the idea of EU taxes 
other than the very limited financial 
transactions tax agreed on 21st January 2013. It 
is therefore useful to consider what other own 
resources (but let’s call them what they are: EU 
taxes) could be adopted and how they would be 
set.  
Since the EU budget was last substantially 
reformed in 1988, there have been repeated 
attempts to identify new revenue streams that 
could be used to fund the EU budget. Various 
credible instruments have been identified and 
their respective attributes carefully dissected, 
but these efforts have – so far – come to 
nothing, with the result that a quarter of a 
century later, the share of national 
contributions in funding the EU budget has 
grown. Moreover, the European Parliament has 
the dubious characteristic of exercising 
representation without taxation, in stark 
contrast to the slogan of the Boston tea party. 
As part of the EU governance reforms, the 
case for assigning certain tax streams to the 
EU, or at least to the euro area, is worth a fresh 
look.  
In particular, corporate taxation at EU level, 
which would be consistent with a more closely 
integrated single market, should be a 
contender, especially if a macroeconomic 
stabilisation role is envisaged. The scale of 
resistance is easy to anticipate and the 
complications of agreeing a common tax base 
are considerable. Nevertheless, a crucial 
property of corporate taxation is that it would 
provide a degree of automatic stabilisation of 
asymmetric shocks, for the simple reason that 
tax yields tend to fall in areas hit by economic 
downturns and to rise in areas experiencing 
booms. 
A second challenge, one that will not disappear 
soon, is the disjunction between EU and euro 
area membership, exacerbated by that fact that 
there are differing positions among the ten 
current ‘outs’. While it is tempting to think 
that, in the long-term (that is beyond the five 
years used to delineate it in the Blueprint), the 
number of ‘outs’ will have dwindled to two or 
three, the accession over a similar time horizon 
of more new member states will inevitably 
prolong the dilemma. Even if only Sweden and 
the UK continue to stand outside the euro, 
there would remain a governance problem. It is 
understandable that a Commission Blueprint 
should want to soft-pedal the notion of 
variable geometry in future, but as the 
Cameron speech of 23rd January 2013 makes 
clear, it is a problem that cannot be overlooked.  
Third, the crisis has been dogged by a number 
of episodes of flawed communication in which 
careless language has ‘spooked’ markets. 
Central bankers have learned over decades the 
importance of careful use of language and the 
same lessons have to be learned in other 
domains of economic policy where economic 
stability could be compromised by unfortunate 
language or public airing of differences. It is an 
aspect of governance that is not directly 
addressed in the Blueprint. 
Overall the Blueprint offers a careful and 
comprehensive basis for debate. It is, perhaps, 
a bit too circumspect in relation to the longer-
term, with too much use of terms like ‘could’ 
or ‘might also be considered’ which make it 
hard to discern which ideas are central to the 
proposed framework and which are more 
speculative. The challenge for the Commission 
may therefore be to follow it with a clear 
statement of ‘here is what we want the 
outcome to be’. 
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What is Political Union?  
European leaders must make three choices about 
the type of political union they want.  The first 
choice is between a limited economic federation 
aimed at stabilising the euro and a full economic 
federation taking on traditional nation state tasks, 
such as taxation, social welfare and 
redistribution. The second choice is between a 
rules-based federation with a very small margin 
for policy innovation and one with discretionary 
powers and policy instruments. The third choice 
is between a political system that relies on 
indirect legitimacy and is governed mostly 
through intergovernmental mechanisms and one 
that draws on direct legitimacy instruments and 
confers executive authority to supranational 
institutions. The authors state that a balance 
must be struck between these three options that 
allows the EU to retain legitimacy and be 
flexible, while still based upon rules. 
h t t p : / / e c f r . e u / p a g e / - /
ECFR70_POLITICAL_UNION_BRIEF_AW.pdf 
Democracy in Europe  
The author contends that democracy in Europe 
is facing a multi-layered crisis affecting several, if 
not all, levels of government. He argues that 
politics is currently at the service of private or 
partial, rather than general, interests. The 
discrediting of the functioning of democratic 
institutions entails a devaluation of democratic 
values, such as anti-discrimination, equality, and 
fundamental rights. Values such as coexistence 
and solidarity, in short, have come to be 
associated with a system that does not perform 
and deliver to everyone’s satisfaction, so that 
defenders of an open society end up being seen 
as representatives of only a few. This anti-
democratic drift has many expressions: a sharp 
drop in confidence in institutions, voter 
radicalisation, social mobilisation, particularly in 
Southern Europe, and disengagement through 
sheer alienation. 
http://www.cidob.org/en/publications/queestions_cidob/
n 1 _ 2 2 /
democracy_in_europe_the_expressions_of_a_european_disease 
Governing Risky and Uncertain Financial 
Markets 
Policymakers should take a ‘macroprudential’ 
approach to financial systems, the author maintains, 
because it takes uncertainty and risk seriously and 
thus is a route to a more robust financial system. 
This approach limits the systemic fallout from a 
crisis by obliging financial institutions to build large 
buffers during strong economic times. Therefore, 
when banks have to pull themselves out of a crisis, 
capital adequacy requirements can be loosened. The 
macroprudential agenda also gives a more active 
role to regulatory authorities as well as greater 
attention to new methods for simulating the 
performance of models in worst case scenarios. 
The infrastructure for implementing 
macroprudential policies is already in place. 
Ultimately however, the culture of risk management 
must be reengineered, so that participants recognise 
that markets are environments characterised by 
both risks and uncertainties. 
http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-comments-
e n / s w p - a k t u e l l e - d e t a i l s / a r t i c l e /
governing_financial_markets.html 
Southern Europe in Trouble: Domestic and 
foreign policy challenges of the financial crisis 
Each author examines the effects of the crisis on 
the policies of Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal, 
analyses the impact of the financial predicament 
on relations with the US and advances proposals 
on how to respond to the crisis while avoiding 
negative transatlantic fallout. To respond to the 
crisis and retain influence on the global stage, the 
authors suggest that Southern European countries 
create a new regional cooperation framework and 
support stronger EU economic governance. In 
regards to transatlantic interests, they should 
support a FTA with the US, help forge a common 
transatlantic strategy to facilitate the process of 
democratic change in the Mediterranean, and 
finally, work towards increasing NATO’s 
projection through the Mediterranean dialogue 
and individual partnerships. 
h t tp ://www . i a i . i t/pd f/med i t e r r an e o/GMF -IAI/
Mediterranean-paper_18.pdf 
4 Think Tank Twitter 
Think Tank Twitter (TTT) aims to provide regular information and updates on what is produced by think tanks and research centres across 
Europe (and beyond) on EU policy issues. As an analogy to the original Twitter, each summary – or tweet – does not exceed 140 words, rather 
than characters. Those who wish to signal new publications for possible inclusion can send them to the email address bepa-think-tank-
twitter@ec.europa.eu 
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The Arctic: A region of the future for the 
European Union and the world economy 
The EU should continue its bid for permanent 
observer status within the Artic Council as well 
as strengthen its relationship with Greenland to 
ensure that it is able to take advantage of 
climate change in the Arctic region. Via 
Greenland, the Artic is a new frontier, offering 
new maritime routes, easier access to off-shore 
natural resources and expanded fishery 
resources. With Greenland moving towards 
independence, the annual block grant from 
Denmark will be withdrawn. Since the financial 
repercussions of this are unknown and there is 
growing competition with Asian economies for 
access to resources, the EU should offer 
Greenland an economic ‘safety net’ and follow 
up on a 2012 letter of cooperation signed with 
Greenland that would secure its supply of rare 
earth materials. 
http://www.robert-schuman.eu/doc/questions_europe/qe-
263-en.pdf 
 
The Changed Geopolitics of Energy and 
Climate and the Challenge for European 
Commission 
The world energy system is undergoing a 
transition in which three agendas collide: an 
economic agenda; a security agenda; and a 
sustainability agenda. While Europe has pursued 
enlightened energy objectives, it has ignored 
major inconsistencies, massive government 
intervention and disappointingly small gains. 
Putting the market back at the centre, 
eliminating subsidies and learning from 
strategies that work among other ‘E7’ players 
would bring Europe closer to its objectives of 
sustainability, security and competitiveness. A 
transatlantic initiative to promote deeper 
integration of the world’s three major regional 
gas markets around a common price discovery 
system could be a key stepping stone in 
developing broader architecture. This initiative 
should also include a better managed pricing 
system for carbon emissions in Europe and 
globally. 
h t t p : / / w w w . c l i n g e n d a e l . n l /
publications/2012/20121217_ciep_bressand.pdf 
When the Rising Dragon Sees Fading Stars: 
China’s view of the European Union 
Due to the growing negative perception of the 
EU in China, Europe should work to improve 
Chinese public opinion as well as foster a 
deeper relationship. The EU should engage the 
new Chinese leaders on how China can help 
solve the European debt crisis; know which 
PSC members are in which factions to enable 
cooperation in policy fields; work with the 
Chinese to improve their position in multilateral 
organisations; and launch negotiations for an 
EU-China Investment Agreement. Finally, 
although the crisis has discredited the European 
model in some aspects, the EU should work to 
remain a model in areas such as consumer 
protection standardisation, ecological and 
sustainable urbanisation, education and research 
systems, as well as peaceful integration and 
cooperation with neighbouring countries. 
http://www.ceps.eu/book/when-rising-dragon-sees-fading-stars-
china%E2%80%99s-view-european-union 
 
EU Democracy Promotion in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood: A turn to civil society? 
The authors argue that the EU needs to review 
the way it implements civil society support in 
the Eastern neighbourhood if its initiatives are 
to effectively contribute to demand driven, 
bottom up reform. The EU must improve the 
balance between aid going to state and non-
state actors; continue reforming funding 
procedures; develop modes to support civil 
society initiatives; and increasingly involve civil 
society actors in designing and implementing its 
aid programmes to governments in the regions. 
It should build bridges between civil society, 
political society and state authorities, and use 
other international aid organisation’s successes 
as examples to ensure better use of resources 
provided. Finally, the EU needs to devise its 
own evaluation tools to assess the state of civil 
society in those countries where its aid is 
destined. 
http://www.fride.org/publication-newsletter/1088/eu-
democracy-promotion-in-the-eastern-neighbourhood:-a-turn-to-civil-
society 
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Arrivals and Departures 
BEPA is pleased to welcome new additions to its 
team. Inês Sérvulo Correia joined the Outreach 
Team from the President’s Cabinet on 1 January 
to work on the pilot project on a new narrative 
for Europe. Jim Dratwa also joined BEPA in 
January from DG RTD to lead the Ethics Team 
and the European Group on Ethics (EGE) 
Secretariat. Didier Schmitt, a Seconded National 
Expert, joined BEPA from the European Space 
Agency on 1 December to work part-time with 
the Chief Scientific Advisor. Finally, BEPA is 
pleased to welcome Lynn Scavée, assistant in the 
Analysis Team. 
João Marques de Almeida left the BEPA 
Outreach Team in January to pursue new 
opportunities at the Holdingham Group in 
London. We wish him all the best in his new 
endeavours. 
Events 
On 3 December, the EGE had its final 
Rapporteurs meeting of the year to examine the 
adoption of Opinion No. 27 – An ethical framework 
for assessing research, production and the use of energy, 
followed by a plenary EGE meeting on 11-12 
December which led to the adoption of the 
Opinion No. 27 on 16 January.  
On 14 December, BEPA hosted a seminar on the 
European Social Market Economy in partnership 
with the Church and Society Commission of the 
Conference of European Churches (CEC) and 
the Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of 
the European Community (COMECE). Topics 
discussed included the social and competitive 
aspects of the European social market economy, 
its development in member states, and challenges 
of youth unemployment in the EU. The 
discussion concluded with presentations of best 
practices and a call for deeper solidarity across 
country borders.  
The three ESPAS Working Groups on economy, 
society and governance and power met for the 
first time on 18 December to discuss the 
respective winning bids and convene a working 
programme. The interinstitutional ESPAS Task 
Force also met on the same day to reflect on the 
overall ESPAS work programme, discuss the 
organisation of the ESPAS conference and the 
development of the project website, as well as 
give the external contractors the opportunity to 
present and discuss their proposals. 
On 22 January, BEPA organised a seminar on 
public investment banks to exchange views and 
learn lessons on best practice. Panellists 
deliberated on the rationale of public investment 
banks, the role of the European Investment Bank 
and lessons to be drawn from experience in 
Germany, the EBRD and Brazil. The event was 
opened by BEPA Director-General Jean-Claude 
Thébault and participants included Arnaud 
Oseredczuk, Economic Adviser to President 
Hollande. Jonathan Faull, Director General of 
DG MARKT, gave a keynote speech over lunch.  
Upcoming events 
The European Group on Ethics will hold its next 
meeting on 19-20 February and will start working 
on a new Opinion on the ethics of security and 
surveillance. 
On 18 February, the three ESPAS Working 
Groups will meet again with the contractors to 
discuss the first results emerging from their 
research on economy, society and governance and 
power.  
On 18-19 February, BEPA will host the annual 
ESPAS conference titled “Developing Strategic 
Thinking in the EU-Global Trends 2030”. A 
distinguished line up of international speakers 
from policy, think tanks, government and the 
EU institutions will be present and/or discuss 
global trends and the ESPAS project. President 
Barroso will give the opening speech. Topics to 
be discussed include ambitions for Europe, 
global trends, the challenges of prosperity, the 
empowerment of the individual as well as 
governance and power.  
On 28 February, BEPA in partnership with 
Carnegie Europe, will host the 4th EU-Russia 
Forum. Participants – including 50 experts from 
Russia, the EEAS, the Commission, member state 
representatives, and think thanks – will discuss 
the political situation in Russia, bilateral trade 
issues, energy and the  neighbourhood. 
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